# FAQ ## Foundations ### Why does Aureum exist? Balancer V3 has the best AMM architecture in DeFi, and the worst tokenomics. Multi-asset weighted pools, ERC-4626 native yield, hooks, Certora-verified pool math. Emissions still bled into legacy pools and circular governance staking. Meta-governance capture concentrated power. The founding entity shut down. Their parting proposal eliminated emissions outright, removing the only path external builders had to bootstrap new infrastructure on top of the architecture. Aureum forks the verified contracts, drops the broken token layer, and replaces it with a fair launch where the only way to earn tokens is to provide liquidity to productive pools. Same code. Different economics. ### What is AuMM? AuMM is a fair-launch ERC-20 on Ethereum with a 21,000,000 hard cap and a Bitcoin-style halving every 10,512,000 blocks (~4 years). The only way to earn it is by providing liquidity to emission-qualified Aequilibrium pools. No pre-mine, no team allocation, no VC round. AuMM has zero governance power. Value accrual is mechanical, not narrative: the protocol share of swap fees on every non-Bodensee gauged pool plus the 10% ERC-4626 yield skim flows as one-sided stablecoin into der Bodensee Pool, whose fixed 40% AuMM / 30% sUSDS / 30% svZCHF weights reprice AuMM upward as the stablecoin side deepens. No buyback, no burn, no oracle. ### Is emission allocation rule-based or discretionary, and what's the difference between CCC and CCB? Rule-based, and governance cannot touch it by any path. CCC, the Continuous Capital Corporation, is the design philosophy. It comes from Dr. Luzius Meisser's 2024 PhD thesis and Frankencoin's implementation: a protocol that runs as a fully autonomous corporation, allocating capital and managing reserves through fixed on-chain rules with no treasury wallet and no human override. Aureum adopts this from block 0. CCB, the Continuous Central Bank, is the algorithm that does the allocation. Three phases. Through Month 10, each of the 28 Miliarium pools receives 1/28 of the LP emission tranche regardless of TVL. Months 11 and 12 linearly blend equal weighting into CCB. After Year 1, every eligible pool scores by its 60-day TVL EMA times its CCB multiplier, normalized across the protocol. The multiplier adjusts bi-weekly for the 28 Miliarium pools only, within an immutable ±0.05 step, [0.75, 1.25] clamp, and 0.1% dead zone. Other gauged pools score on EMA only. CCC is the rulebook. CCB is what the rulebook does every block. --- ## LP Economics ### Why LP in Aureum? Four overlapping yield streams, and the first one starts before AuMM has any price. ERC-4626 native yield. Every Miliarium pool holds at least 52% yield-bearing tokens by weight. svZCHF, sUSDS, Aave wrappers, and similar 4626 tokens accrue in-place via Balancer V3 Rate Providers. Aggregate native yield runs in the 2.0% to 2.8% range, structural, independent of trading volume. Highest AuMM per dollar in Year 1. Through Month 10, all 28 Miliarium pools split the LP tranche equally, 1/28 each, regardless of TVL. Era 0 emits 1.00 AuMM per block. After the first halving, that drops to 0.50 forever. Era 0 is the highest-issuance window the protocol will ever have. Cross-pool arbitrage. The ixEDEL NAV mint/redeem cycle and svZCHF rate updates generate continuous arbitrage flow between pools. Each cross-pool hop pays fees in two pools at once. This is volume that does not depend on retail. Mechanical AuMM repricing. The protocol share of swap fees from every non-Bodensee gauged pool plus 100% of the 10% ERC-4626 yield skim flows as one-sided stablecoin into der Bodensee. AuMM inflows to Bodensee decay to zero by Month 10 and stay there. Stablecoin inflows are continuous. Fixed weights enforce upward repricing. ### Where does protocol revenue come from? Two streams. Swap fees. Miliarium pools charge 0.03% at genesis, governable within the 0.01% to 0.30% band. The split is a Vault registration invariant, not a governance parameter: `protocolSwapFeePercentage = 50e16`, hardcoded at pool registration, immutable. Roughly half of every swap fee stays with originating-pool LPs through Vault accounting. Roughly half is the protocol share. The Balancer V3 hook fires `onAfterSwap`, swaps the protocol share to svZCHF, and one-sided deposits it into Bodensee. No treasury, no wallet split. ERC-4626 yield skim. The protocol takes 10% of yield generated by 4626 tokens held inside non-Bodensee gauged pools and routes 100% of that to Bodensee as one-sided svZCHF. The source is vault yield, not trading. This is why the protocol earns from block 0 regardless of volume. Trades inside Bodensee charge 0.75% at genesis, governable within 0.10% to 1.00%. The full fee stays in pool for Bodensee LPs and does not pass through the protocol pipeline. A worked example at scale. $100M Miliarium TVL across the 28, $20M average daily volume, 0.03% fee. The protocol leg of the swap fee routes about $1,095,000 a year into Bodensee. The yield fee leg adds $100M times 60% 4626 weight times 2.5% average yield times 10% skim, roughly $150,000 a year. Combined: about $1,245,000 in annual stablecoin depth. ### What's the swap fee, the band, the cooldown? Miliarium pools genesis at 0.03%, governable within 0.01% to 0.30%. Non-Miliarium gauged pools share that band. Bodensee's band is 0.10% to 1.00%, genesis 0.75%. Any fee change is gated by `FEE_CHANGE_COOLDOWN_BLOCKS = BLOCKS_PER_EPOCH = 100,800`, one full epoch, fourteen days. Cooldown is immutable. Proposal cost: 1,000 svZCHF or 1,250 sUSDS, deposited one-sided into Bodensee, non-refundable. The 50/50 split on the protocol fee is not governable. --- ## Value Accrual ### What gives AuMM real value accrual? Mechanics, not narrative. Bodensee holds 40% AuMM, 30% sUSDS, 30% svZCHF, in fixed weights, immutable from block 0. The pool's invariant enforces those proportions at every trade. AuMM inflows decay from 80% of each block at genesis to 50% by the end of Month 6, then to zero by the end of Month 10. After that, no AuMM enters the pool except by being purchased. Stablecoin inflows are continuous and grow with usage. As the stablecoin side deepens against fixed AuMM supply, weighted-pool math reprices AuMM upward. There is no buyback, no burn, no oracle, no discretion. On top of that, 60% of Bodensee's TVL sits in svZCHF and sUSDS, and that yield compounds inside the pool through the Rate Providers, raising rate-scaled balances on the stablecoin side without any token movement. The dilution ceiling is the halving schedule. Emission to LPs falls by half every 10,512,000 blocks. Markets price the curve from day one. ### Why is Bodensee excluded from the yield skim? Bodensee already holds 60% of its TVL in 4626. Skimming 10% of Bodensee's own yield to deposit it back into Bodensee would be a no-op that only burns gas. Bodensee's 4626 yield compounds in-place via Rate Providers. The skim is a one-way pipe from every other gauged pool into Bodensee. ### How does APY change when AuMM is being bought in Bodensee? Bodensee is the price oracle for AuMM. Buying pulls AuMM out of the pool and pushes stablecoin in, and the pool reprices AuMM upward to enforce the 40% weight. Emission APY in dollar terms is `(emitted AuMM × AuMM price × blocks/year) / LP TVL`. Block emission is fixed. A higher price flows directly into LP APY. There is a reflexive loop. Higher LP APY pulls more TVL into Miliarium pools, which produces more swap volume, which sends more protocol-share stablecoin into Bodensee. Bodensee deepens. AuMM reprices higher. The 60-day EMA dampener is what keeps it from running away: new TVL takes weeks to register fully in emission weights, so APY stays elevated longer than capital can compete it down. Bodensee LPs benefit separately. Every AuMM trade inside the pool charges 0.75%, retained in pool, on top of the in-place vault yield. The ceiling is the AuMM side itself. After Month 10, no new AuMM enters via bootstrap. Sustained buying without matching protocol stablecoin inflows eventually thins the AuMM side and widens spreads. --- ## Routing and Demand ### What has to be true for the routing thesis to work? Aggregators route to depth. 1inch, Paraswap, and CoW route based on best execution, which is a function of slippage, which is a function of liquidity. The constellation's small-world topology, with svZCHF and ixEDEL as connectors, is latent until pools cross the depth at which aggregators begin splitting routes through them. Before that depth exists, three things bridge the gap. The founding team seeds pools with svZCHF and ixEDEL at launch, which gives every Miliarium pool ERC-4626 yield from block 0. Through Month 10, all 28 pools split the LP tranche equally, so even a thin pool earns tokens. Anyone can pay for an Incendiary Boost: deposit svZCHF or sUSDS one-sided into Bodensee and a target pool gets a 14-day priority emission stream. ### Who actually buys AuMM exposure? Two constituencies buy AuMM, and they don't want the same thing. The first group is buying scarcity and routed revenue. AuMM has a Bitcoin-style halving and a fixed cap ([What is AuMM?](#what-is-aumm)), so issuance falls on schedule regardless of narrative. The protocol share of swap fees on gauged pools and the ERC-4626 yield skim flow one-sided into der Bodensee, where the immutable 40/30/30 weights reprice AuMM upward as stablecoin depth grows ([What gives AuMM real value accrual?](#what-gives-aumm-real-value-accrual), [Where does protocol revenue come from?](#where-does-protocol-revenue-come-from)). These buyers aren't here for governance. They are holding a fixed-supply curve attached to a live AMM revenue pipeline. The second group is LPs and emission-aligned participants. Block emission is denominated in AuMM, not dollars, so when AuMM reprices, the dollar APY on every emission-earning pool scales with it ([How does APY change when AuMM is being bought in Bodensee?](#how-does-apy-change-when-aumm-is-being-bought-in-bodensee)). An LP in a constellation pool benefits whenever Bodensee absorbs more depth — even without holding a single AuMM directly. ("Players" in this context means emission-earning LPs, not the gaming-the-system actors covered elsewhere.) The two aren't exclusive. An LP who also holds AuMM is long scarcity, routed revenue, and their own pool's dollar yield at the same time. Not investment advice. The thesis only works as long as swap volume, Bodensee depth, and the contracts themselves do — see [What's the catastrophic-risk profile?](#whats-the-catastrophic-risk-profile). --- ## Governance ### What can governance actually do, and what does each action cost? Governance is permitted three actions. None of them touch emission allocation. Gauge eligibility is not a governance action — a new pool becomes gauge-eligible permissionlessly the moment it satisfies the immutable criteria gate (4626 Quality Gate, $10K TVL on 7-day SMA, no self-referential tokens). Anti-spam fee: 100 svZCHF or 125 sUSDS, one-sided into Bodensee, non-refundable on success or any failed check. No vote, no quorum. A gauge challenge revokes an existing non-Miliarium gauge. Deposit follows F-12: `max(10 BTC CHF equiv., 1,000,000 CHF × √((1−p_tvl)(1−p_eff)))`, one-sided into Bodensee. Threshold: simple majority, 20% quorum. Cannot target the 28 Miliarium pools. A fee proposal changes a swap fee rate within its immutable band, Miliarium and non-Miliarium gauged at 0.01% to 0.30%, Bodensee at 0.10% to 1.00%. Deposit: 1,000 svZCHF or 1,250 sUSDS. Threshold: simple majority, 20% quorum. Cannot move the rate outside the band, cannot change the Vault's 50/50 protocol vs LP split. A composition challenge deprecates a Miliarium pool slot and replaces it with an already-deployed candidate pool of the same sector, risk profile, and template role. The proposal must reference the candidate's contract address (specified-pool model). Deposit: 1,000 svZCHF or 1,250 sUSDS. Threshold: 2/3 supermajority, 20% quorum. The slot persists, the pool at the slot can change. Every deposit is one-sided into Bodensee, non-refundable, denominated in svZCHF or sUSDS (1:1.25 ratio, proposer's choice). Below 20% quorum, the proposal auto-rejects. Governance power requires AuMT in emission-qualified pools held continuously for at least 14 days, with a 6-month sublinear on-ramp to full weight, and any withdrawal at any time, even 1%, resets that position to zero. Governance cannot alter the emission schedule, halving math, CCB engine parameters, fee distribution split, Bodensee composition, dampening exponents, eligibility criteria, or any other immutable parameter. ### How does a new pool get gauged? Permissionlessly. There is no governance vote on gauging individual pools. A pool becomes gauge-eligible the moment it satisfies the immutable criteria gate, and stays gauged until those criteria fail or someone successfully revokes it. The activation criteria. (1) The 4626 Quality Gate: at least 52% of pool weight in yield-bearing tokens whose ERC-4626 class is admitted to the Vault-Class Registry. (2) Minimum TVL: $10K on a 7-day SMA. (3) No self-referential tokens — AuMM cannot be a pool component. (4) Pool type on the Aequilibrium pool-type allowlist (WeightedPool, StablePool, etc.) — separate from the Vault-Class Registry, which admits 4626 token classes, not pool types. All four must hold simultaneously and are enforced on-chain. The activation cost. A flat anti-spam fee — `antiSpamFee = 100 svZCHF` or 125 sUSDS — deposited one-sided into Bodensee, non-refundable on success or any failed check. No vote, no quorum, no proposal. The fee exists to prevent zero-cost gauge farming. The Vault-Class Registry. The Quality Gate counts a token toward the 52% threshold only if its ERC-4626 class appears in the registry. A class is identified by one of three fingerprints — `ImplementationAddress`, `FactoryAddress`, or `BytecodeHash` — submitted by the proposer. Genesis classes are hard-coded at Miliarium Aureum construction. New classes enter via a proposal-with-veto flow: post the proposal bond (at least `antiSpamFee`), proposal enters a veto window, auto-finalizes at expiry unless governance casts a vetoing vote that meets the veto threshold. The model fits the action — class admission is a bounded technical verification, not a contested protocol change. Governance retains a backstop via the veto path during the window and via revocation (`revokeVaultClass`) at any later point. After activation. The pool enters tournament accounting at base CCB multiplier `M_i = 1.0` and competes via standard CCB. Once active, it must continue to satisfy the criteria gate plus a graduated Volume Percentile Floor (5th from Month 3, 10th from Month 6, 15th from Month 13). Disqualified for 4 consecutive epochs and the gauge revokes automatically. Qualified AuMT holders can also submit a Gauge Challenge at any time, with deposit per F-12 scaling on pool TVL and inverse efficiency. Cold-start support comes from Incendiary Boost (user-funded, optional). What is NOT permissionless. The 28 Miliarium Aureum slots are locked at launch and cannot be added to — replacing one requires a Composition Challenge (2/3 supermajority, 20% quorum). New ERC-4626 token classes go through the registry's veto flow above. ### Why fourth root, then cube root? Voting power is `(qualified_AuMT_value × time_in_pool)^(1/4)` in Era 0, transitioning permanently to `^(1/3)` at the first halving block. Era 0 is when the protocol is still small enough that one whale LP could take most governance power from TVL share alone. The fourth root softens that. By year 4, natural TVL growth has done most of the work. The cube root matches lower capture risk in a larger ecosystem. The transition fires at one block: immutable, no vote. ### Are there really no admin keys? Multisig has emergency-only role for ~12 months (`BLOCKS_PER_YEAR`), then dies permanently. Contracts become fully immutable—no admin keys, upgrades, pauses, or authority. Purpose: safe launch then decentralization. Actions allowed are emergency-only for ~12 months (`BLOCKS_PER_YEAR`), then gone: pause pools/vault, kill gauges (stop emissions), recovery mode, disable factories, denylist tokens—pure exploit containment, not operations. No upgrades, fee changes, parameter edits, fund routing, or mandate extension. After that window: fully immutable; no admin path. --- ## Anti-Gaming ### What if a whale tries to gauge a pool of his own shitcoin? The contract kills the easy version at the criteria gate — no vote, no proposal. The 4626 Quality Gate requires at least 52% of pool weight in ERC-4626 yield-bearing tokens **whose vault class is admitted to the Vault-Class Registry**. A shitcoin is not 4626. A freshly minted fake 4626 wrapper fails the registry — its class has not been admitted, so its weight contributes zero to the 52% numerator and falls into the ≤48% complement. AuMM itself cannot be a pool component, the no-self-referential-tokens rule. There is also a structural minimum: $10K TVL on a 7-day SMA before any emission flows. Suppose he passes the gate by stacking 52% in legitimate 4626 (svZCHF and sUSDS) and dropping the shitcoin into the remaining 48%. The 100 svZCHF or 125 sUSDS anti-spam fee is non-refundable, paid one-sided into Bodensee. Once gauged, qualified AuMT holders — existing productive LPs who built governance weight on a 6-month on-ramp — can submit a gauge challenge at any time, with deposit per F-12 scaling on pool TVL and inverse efficiency. The same hostile electorate that would have blocked the proposal now revokes the gauge. Once gauged, the volume floor catches the pool. Months 0 to 3 are exempt. From month 3, the pool must clear the 5th volume percentile; from month 6, the 10th; from month 13, the 15th. A shitcoin pool generates no organic volume. Between the 10th and 15th, the pool sits in the Warning zone: emissions continue, with 3 epochs (6 weeks) to recover above the 15th. Below the 10th, emissions cease immediately. Disqualified for 4 consecutive epochs (8 weeks), gauge revoked permanently. No vote required. If he wash-trades to fake volume, the efficiency tournament caps him at month 13. Efficiency is `(swap_fees + 4626_yield_revenue_to_DAO) / emissions_received`. Inflated TVL makes the denominator huge while real revenue stays near zero. Pools below the 5th percentile cap at 0.1% of total emissions, 5th to 10th at 0.5%, 10th to 15th at 1%. Excess emissions redistribute pro-rata to uncapped pools. Inflating TVL with his own shitcoin can boost his EMA, but the EMA samples once per day on a 720-block (1 hour) TWAP and uses a 60-day half-life with α = 2/61. A sudden injection takes weeks to fully register. The bi-weekly CCB multiplier never applies to his pool, only to the 28 Miliarium pools. Anything else competes on raw EMA only. ### Why is the attack uneconomic even when technically possible? The capital that buys him governance weight is also his hostage. Any withdrawal, any amount, resets governance power to zero and restarts the 6-month on-ramp. So his real LP capital has to stay deposited for the entire duration of the attack, not just long enough to vote. To cash out farmed AuMM, he sells into Bodensee, where his sells push the price down against stablecoin reserves he didn't help build. Exit pressure works against farming profits. The cost-benefit math is upside-down. He has spent six months providing real liquidity to legitimate pools, which is exactly the honest use case the protocol wants. His non-refundable deposit deepens Bodensee. His wash-trading subsidizes the protocol fee leg on every fake swap. By the time he qualifies to attack, he's already a net contributor. The attack cost is the honest use case. The system doesn't need to identify him; it makes the honest behavior the precondition for the dishonest behavior, then makes the dishonest behavior unprofitable from the moment he qualifies to execute it. --- ## Sector Rotation ### How does the constellation handle sector rotation? The 28 pools span five sectors: Yield-bearing, Bonds, Crypto Infrastructure, Stocks/Equities, and Metals. The CCB multiplier's within-the-28 channel is built for rotation between them. When crypto rallies hard, the Crypto Infrastructure pools attract inflows. Their TVL EMAs spike against the constellation average. The multiplier, bounded at ±0.05 step within a [0.75, 1.25] clamp, taxes those hot pools and subsidizes the lagging ones, the bond pools, ixMetallum (gold), and ixHelvetia (CHF savings). When tech sells off and capital rotates from ixEquitix or ixInnovix toward ixMetallum or ixHelvetia, fees generate on both legs because svZCHF and ixEDEL are routing rails on both ends. The protocol captures fees on the rotation itself. The anticyclical EMA underneath this is what retains liquidity. When a sector crashes 40%, dollar TVL drops, but the EMA lags. Emission yield in percentage terms spikes precisely when dollar TVL is smallest. That elevated yield is what keeps liquidity from leaving entirely, which is what lets Aureum capture the recovery. --- ## Risk ### What's the catastrophic-risk profile? First, the smart contract layer. Aequilibrium reuses Certora-verified Balancer V3 pool math for the AMM layer; the new tokenomics layer (CCB, gauges, fee routing, Incendiary Boost, Bodensee integration, emissions) must still be independently audited before any user should trust deployment. Smart-contract failure can imply total loss of funds. The second is liquidity failure. If TVL never reaches aggregator-competitive depth, organic volume doesn't materialize, AuMM gets no price discovery, and the LP emission's dollar value goes to zero. The 4626 floor still pays in stablecoins, so it's not a wipeout, but the value-accrual mechanism stops working. Permanent token impairment. Third, fork risk. The code is open source. A better-capitalized team could fork the architecture with pre-mined capital, undercut the equal-emission tranche in Year 1, and own aggregator routing slots before Aureum reaches critical mass. Fourth, regulatory. Fair-launch with no pre-mine is the strongest posture available, but the protocol fee routing creates revenue that reaches Bodensee LPs, and that could attract attention in jurisdictions that pattern-match to investment pools. Fifth, market apathy. A bear market at launch delays adoption while the halving schedule keeps running. Year 1 is the highest-issuance window and delay is costly. --- ## Comparative Position ### How is Aureum different from previous fair-launch AMMs? The fair-launch graveyard is mostly the same set of failures. SushiSwap had a backdoor: Chef Nomi controlled the dev fund and sold $14M, with admin keys hidden in the migration contract. It had a vampire dependency: rented liquidity that left when incentives faded. It had immediate governance capture: FTX/Alameda accumulated tokens and directed treasury spending. Underneath all that, SushiSwap was a commodity product. Same Uniswap V2 pairs, same architecture, no moat once incentives ran out. Aureum's answers are concrete. No admin keys (with the one-time Stage B exception above). No migration contract. No treasury wallet. AuMM is unmintable to any wallet. Constituent tokens, WBTC, cbBTC, PAXG, XAUt, sfrxUSD, stEURA, AAVE, LINK, trade $898M+ daily on chain, so volume isn't conditional on incentives. ERC-4626 native yield provides floor return at zero emissions. Governance requires active AuMT in emission-qualified pools; it cannot be bought on an exchange. The halving curve is priced from day one. Multi-asset weighted pools with hooks and constellation routing don't exist on Uniswap, Curve, or Aerodrome. ### How does Aureum compare to Yield Basis? Curve's Yield Basis (March 2026) validated the same core thesis from a different angle: sustainable AMM growth requires conviction capital, not reflexive incentives. Yield Basis enforces that at the user level, requiring an LP to deposit crvUSD before unlocking BTC/ETH pool capacity. Aureum enforces it at the protocol level through EMA-weighted emissions, the 52% 4626 Quality Gate, and immutable anti-gaming gates. Yield Basis depends on the crvUSD peg and a Curve DAO credit line. Aureum's stability layer is internal and oracle-free. The two compose: a future Aureum gauge could include scrvUSD as a 4626 component once its vault class is admitted to the Vault-Class Registry. ### How does Aureum compare to current Balancer? Balancer V3 is the source code, byte-identical at the pool layer; the divergence is purely economic. Balancer routes its protocol fee share to a discretionary DAO treasury managed by a team. Aureum routes 100% of its protocol share to an immutable pool that mechanically reprices the token, with no human controlling the destination. Aureum's incremental risk relative to Balancer V3 is the new tokenomics layer above the verified pool math. --- ## Ecosystem ### How does Aureum interact with Reserve Protocol and ixEDEL? ixEDEL is one of the two universal connectors in the constellation. It appears in 26 of 28 Miliarium pools, typically at 16% weight, rising to 46% in ixEdelweiss (slot 05), the dedicated price-discovery hub for ixEDEL. Every cross-pool arbitrage trade that touches ixEDEL pays fees in two pools at once. The Reserve Protocol DTF NAV mint/redeem mechanism is the source of that arbitrage: any drift between a pool's implied ixEDEL price and on-chain NAV opens an arb route that aggregator bots run continuously. ixEDEL is absent only from slot 01 (ixHelvetia) and slot 06 (ixLibertas). ### How does Aureum interact with Frankencoin? svZCHF is the deeper, primary routing rail. It appears in 26 of 28 Miliarium pools, typically at 26% weight, rising to 80% in ixHelvetia (slot 01), the pure Frankencoin money market pool. Pricing reads directly from the Frankencoin contract through a deterministic Rate Provider, no oracle. svZCHF is also the autonomous-reserve anchor: Bodensee holds 30% svZCHF in fixed weight, and every governance proposal, Incendiary Boost, composition challenge, and protocol fee inflow lands as one-sided svZCHF or sUSDS into the pool. As Aureum grows, it becomes a structural buyer of svZCHF, deepening the reserve in step with its own usage. svZCHF is absent only from slot 02 (ixAetheron) and slot 06 (ixLibertas). The shared design lineage is the Continuous Capital Corporation framing from Dr. Luzius Meisser's 2024 PhD thesis and Frankencoin's implementation. ### Is Aureum affiliated with Reserve, Frankencoin, or Sky? No. Aureum is a standalone protocol — not endorsed or operated by any of these projects. The integrations are technical, not contractual: ixEDEL is consumed through Reserve's DTF NAV mechanism, svZCHF through Frankencoin's deterministic rate provider, sUSDS through Sky's ERC-4626 savings vault. Each was picked because it's best-in-class for what Aureum needs, and because each shares the same Cyber DeFi values Aureum itself runs on — immutable contracts, on-chain pricing, oracle-light, no admin keys. Aureum routes through them. It doesn't speak for them or any other protocol with tokens traded in the Aureum Protocol.